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[A] custody decree is not meant to punish a parent, or anyone else; its
only purpose is to help the children.1
I. INTRODUCTION
The Good Mother2 tells the story of a divorced woman, Anna, whose
daughter Molly is the center of her life. Anna's grandfather criticizes her
"bohemian" lifestyle (she teaches piano and works in a lab) and the fact that
her daughter attends daycare instead of being cared for at home. Anna's
ex-husband is an attorney who remarried immediately after their divorce. Anna
meets a sculptor named Leo, and, in time, both she and her daughter enjoy
a close, loving relationship with him. Anna's ex-husband disapproves of her
lifestyle and sexual conduct with Leo, and he institutes a lawsuit to gain
custody of Molly.
At trial, Anna's ex-husband has to prove that she is an unfit mother. He
raises two sexual conduct issues to prove her unfitness: first, that she and Leo
made love one night while Molly was asleep in their bed; second, that Leo
once allowed Molly to touch his penis after she asked his permission to do so.
A psychiatrist testifies that Molly was not harmed by either incident, that she
has a very strong relationship with Anna, and that taking custody of Molly
away from Anna would actually put Molly "at risk." It is also clear that Molly
wants to remain with her mother. Nonetheless, the court awards custody to
Molly's father, even though he and his wife are both described as workaholics
who will not have a great deal of time to spend raising Molly.
t Law Clerk, Judge Raymond J. Pettine, United States District Court for the District of Rhode Island;
A.B., Brown University, 1988; J.D., Yale Law School, 1991. 1 am indebted to Pamela Smith, Fall
Ferguson, John DiPaolo, Alisa Jancu, and Maria Acebal for their invaluable editoral assistance. I would
also like to thank David Leventhal, Kristen Boyles, and David Dorsey for their cogent substantive comments
as well as for their unflagging moral support and encouragement. This article is dedicated to the memory
of my great-grandmother, Rebecca Kowarski Magid, whose life demonstrated that feminism was born long
before I was.
1. In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 125 (Pa. Super. 1982) (citations omitted).
2. SUE MILLER, THE GOOD MOTHER (1986).
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Anna's losing battle to retain custody of Molly in The Good Mother
illustrates the problem I explore in this article: the denial of custody to women
whose conduct does not adhere to many judges' sexist notions about acceptable
conduct by a mother. I begin by evaluating the child custody standards which
have predominated in the United States since colonial days. As Section II
demonstrates, antiquated notions of male and female roles within the family
underlie most of these custody standards. In addition, some custody standards
have been defined in such nebulous terms that judicial discretion in their
application is virtually limitless. The cases discussed in Sections III-V
demonstrate that judicial discretion often results in custody decisions denying
women custody not because they are incapable of responsible parenting, but
simply because they are women.
I examine one child custody standard that shows promise as a non-
discriminatory method for determining custody. The primary caretaker standard
requires courts to award custody to those parents who have been principally
responsible for attending to their children's daily needs; one state supreme
court has enumerated ten specific factors to be applied in determining which
parent is the primary caretaker.' The standard's specificity limits the degree
to which judicial discretion can be injected into custody decisions.
West Virginia was the first state to adopt the primary caretaker standard,4
and today it is the sole state to use the standard in its "pure" form.' In Section
III of this article, I evaluate how West Virginia has implemented the standard.
From 1985 to 1989, Minnesota joined West Virginia in applying the primary
caretaker standard to custody cases;" in Section IV, I analyze the results of
Minnesota's brief experiment with the standard.
As Sections III and IV demonstrate, the primary caretaker standard is
laudable in theory, but not in practice. Every variation of the standard has
included an exception denying custody to primary caretaking parents who are
deemed "unfit."' While the standard itself is quite specific, no court has
defined the parental unfitness exception in other than extremely vague terms.
Trial court judges in particular have effectively transformed the exception into
a gaping loophole by repeatedly finding primary caretaking mothers "unfit"
on the basis of their sexual conduct (usually characterized as "sexual
3. See infra text accompanying note 50.
4. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
5. Courts in a number of states have adopted a "hybrid" approach, in which the primary caretaker
is one of several factors to be considered in determining child custody. See, e.g., Seibert v. Seibert, 584
N.E.2d 41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990), cert. denied, 558 N.E.2d 60 (Ohio 1990); Derby v. Derby, 571 P.2d
562 (Or. App. 1977); Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113 (Pa. Super. 1982); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117
(Utah 1986). 1 evaluate this hybrid standard in Section V.
6. In 1989, Minnesota's legislature replaced the judicially adopted primary caretaker presumption with
a test in which the primary caretaker is one of twelve factors to be considered. See MINN. STAT. § 518.17,
subd. 1 (Supp. 1992). 1 discuss this development in Minnesota's child custody law in Section V.
7. See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 53 & 142. The implications of the parental unfitness




misconduct"), their survival of domestic abuse,' or their paucity of economic
resources, without establishing any connection between these factors and their
fitness as parents. In short, the vagueness of the unfitness exception
reintroduces unfettered judicial discretion into the primary caretaker standard.
This discretion has had a disproportionately adverse effect on women. In
Section VI of this article, I outline my proposed revision to the primary
caretaker standard: a more precisely defined and narrowly tailored unfitness
exception aimed at reducing judicial discretion and the resultant discriminatory
denial of custody to women.
I write this article from a feminist perspective. As a feminist, I assume that
in the family law context, as elsewhere, a person's gender plays a significant
role in how the law regards him or her. Analysis of the primary caretaker
standard from a feminist perspective thus entails a search for gender-based
patterns in judicial application of the standard. If we find that such patterns
exist, we must reflect on whether these patterns help or harm women.
Reversing legal trends that harm women is the next logical step in a feminist
legal agenda. In the context of family law, however, the concept of harm to
women evades facile definition. Are women harmed by laws that perpetuate
rather than change gendered role definitions within American families? Or,
rather, are we harmed by laws that fail to reflect the reality that mothers bear
greater responsibility for raising children than do fathers?
The relationship between feminism and family law is difficult to define
precisely because there is no single, all-encompassing answer to the question
of what conception of gender equality women should seek within family law.
As legal scholar Martha Minow has suggested, "the meanings of equality are
complicated and multiple .... [There are] contrasts between the idea of formal
legal equality (eliminating gender preferences and disadvantages in legal rules)
and practical equality (eliminating gender-based differentials in the burdens and
benefits actually distributed in people's lives)."9
In studying the effects of the primary caretaker standard on women, I seek
to determine whether the standard fosters or hampers both formal legal equality
and practical equality. Because the standard is facially ungendered (by
8. See PHYLLIS CHESLER, MOTHERS ON TRIAL 149 (1986) (in nationwide study of sixty primary
caretaking mothers engaged in custody disputes, 62% were battered by their husbands during marriage
and/or during marital breakup).
9. Martha Minow, Consider the Consequences, 84 MICH. L. REV. 900, 909-10 (1986) (reviewing
LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC
CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA (1985)). Minow comments further about the
relationship between formal legal equality and practical equality:
[Cihanges in formal legal equality between men and women do not themselves usher in changes
in lived inequalities, and indeed .... formal legal equality can disempower women from
improving their circumstances. The struggle for gender equality is a struggle that must be waged
at the level of assumptions and attitudes-and of actual social and economic practices in
childrearing and in the workplace. Formal legal changes in such items as child custody
preferences could supply a focus for mobilizing such struggles, but they could also disable
individual women in their personal efforts to improve their situations.
Id. at 908.
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expressing a preference for neither men nor women as custodial parents), it
promotes legal equality. As applied, however, the standard has had a
discriminatory impact on women, denying them equality in practice.
This article discusses various sources of discriminatory application of the
primary caretaker standard and its unfitness exception, and proposes a
modification of the standard designed to minimize this problem. Since the
discrimination I seek to address is discrimination against women, I focus on
the standard's effect on women, leaving it to others to argue that the standard
is detrimental to men. As for the children whose custody is at stake, my
concern for their well-being informs my entire analysis."l I will not argue that
women who are incapable of being adequate parents should nonetheless have
custody simply because they are women. On the contrary, the crux of my
argument is that children should not be denied the care of loving, responsible
parents simply because those parents are women.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CHILD CUSTODY STANDARDS
A. Paternal Rights Versus Maternal Preference
Changes in child custody standards over time have reflected both shifting
societal norms regarding women's role in the family and changing notions
about child development. In preindustrial America, the law assumed that men
were the custodial parents of their children." The Industrial Revolution
marked a shift toward a "maternal preference" standard, which generally gave
custody to women. 2 More recently, courts have looked to "the best interests"
of the children in determining which parent shall have custody; 3 some
contemporary courts also favor "joint custody," a regime under which parents
share legal custody of their children. 4 Numerous commentators have written
at length about the evolution of these standards;" I will provide a brief
analysis of each.
Under English common law, as under Roman law, children were the
property of their fathers. Mothers virtually never got custody of their children
10. Evaluation of custody standards strictly from the child's perspective has spawned a wealth of
literature. See, e.g., JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD & ALBERT SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS
OF THE CHILD (1973) [hereinafter BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTSI; BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE
CHILD (1979) [hereinafter BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS]; JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD, ALBERT
SOLNIT & SONJA GOLDSTEIN, IN THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1986) [hereinafter IN THE BEST
INTERESTS].
11. See infra text accompanying notes 16-17.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 18-22.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 29-32.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 42-43.
15. See generally Henry H. Foster & Doris Jonas Freed, Life With Father: 1978, 11 FAM. L.Q. 321
(1978); Marcia O'Kelly, Blessing the ie that Binds: Preference for the Primary Caretaker as Custodian,
63 N.D. L. REV. 481 (1987); Donald C. Schiller, Child Custody: Evolution of Current Criteria, 26
DEPAUL L. REV. 241 (1977).
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following separation or divorce. 6 Colonists carried this practice to the United
States, and it remained the dominant American custody trend until at least the
mid-nineteenth century." The maternal preference standard evolved in
response to the Industrial Revolution and the adoption of compulsory public
education, both of which made children economically less valuable to their
fathers.'8 Courts tended to justify their adoption of a maternal preference by
invoking the unique, irreplaceable nature of mother-child relationships. 9
The "tender years" doctrine presents a variation on the maternal preference
theme. The doctrine centers on the premise that the bond between mothers and
their young children 0 is natural, unique, and singularly important to healthy
child development.2' In custody decisions regarding children of "tender
years," courts applying the doctrine generally award custody to the mother if
she is a "fit" parent.22
In recent years, other standards have almost entirely superceded maternal
preference, with or without the tender years doctrine. Not surprisingly,
"fathers' rights" advocates attacked the doctrine.23 Courts in several states
have held that maternal preference violates the federal Equal Protection clause
16. 1 JEFF ATKINSON, MODERN CHILD CUSTODY PRACTICE 222 (1986).
17. Nancy D. Polikoff, Why Are Mothers Losing: A BriefAnalysis of Criteria Used in Child Custody
Determinations, 7 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 235, 235 (1982). According to West Virginia Supreme Court
Chief Justice Richard Neely, fathers were given custody of their children as a matter of law until the early
twentieth century. Richard Neely, Child Custody and the Dynamics of Greed, 3 YALE L. & POL'Y REV.
168, 169 (1984).
18. Polikoff, supra note 17, at 235.
19. See, e.g., Bruce v. Bruce, 285 P. 30, 37 (Okla. 1930) ("IMlother love is a dominant trait in the
heart of a mother, even in the weakest of women. It is of divine origin, and in nearly all cases far exceeds
and surpasses the parental affection of the father. Every just man recognizes the fact that minor children
need the constant bestowal of the mother's care and love."). For a more recent articulation of the same,
see Meinhardt v. Meinhardt, 111 N.W.2d 782, 784 (Minn. 1961) ("That there is no substitute for the love,
companionship, and guidance of a good mother hardly needs any argument.").
20. Courts differ widely as to the age at which a child is sufficiently "young" for the doctrine to apply.
See Dennis v. Dennis, 1990 WL 207392, at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 1990) (citations omitted) ("There
is considerable disagreement concerning the age at which the infant requires the nurturing care of a female.
Scientific observations appear to place this age between 30 and 60 months.") (quoting BEYOND THE BEST
INTERESTS, supra note 10, at 32-33); Mary Ann Mason, Motherhood v. Equal Treatment, 29 J. FAM. L.
1, 20 (1990) ("The age constituting 'tender years' has been left to judicial discretion, with the teen years
usually considered the upper limit.")
21. See generally Ramsay Laing Klaff, T'he Tender Years Doctrine, 70 CAL. L. REV. 335 (1982);
Allan Roth, The Tender Years Presumption in Child Custody Disputes, 15 J. FAM. L. 423 (1976-77). For
assertions that the mother-child relationship is unique and should therefore be preserved through maternal
preference, see Krieger v. Krieger, 81 P.2d 1081, 1083 (Idaho 1938); Helms v. Franciscus, 2 G. & J.
544 (Md. 1830); JOHN BOWLBY, ATTACHMENT AND Loss 29 (1969).
22. But see Neely, supra note 17, at 170:
In application, the rule of maternal preference allowed judges substantial leeway to take a
mother's fault into consideration in the award of custody. It was frequently the case, therefore,
that sexual "promiscuity" (a term that tends to mean different things when applied to women than
to men, with women getting the short end of the double standard) on the part of the woman
would cause a court to declare her "unfit".
23. See Polikoff, supra note 17, at 236. The recent proliferation of fathers' rights groups is at least
in part a backlash against women's quest for equality in the realm of family law. "Although the fathers'
rights movement purports to act purely from the principles of sex equality and children's interests... much
of its rhetoric has uncomfortably misogynist overtones." Rena K. Uviller, Fathers' Rights and Feminism:
The Maternal Presumption Revisited, 1 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 107, 116 (1978).
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by discriminating against men on the basis of their gender,24 and even states
that have not expressly disavowed the tender years doctrine have sharply
limited its use.'
For women, the maternal preference was a mixed blessing.26 While the
presumption generally benefits women who want custody of their young
children, it also legitimates and reinforces gender-bound roles in American
family life.27 Professor Mary Joe Frug argued that such a legal rule
"maternalizes the female body;" a maternal presumption "not only allocate[s]
disproportionately more child rearing responsibilities to women in formal legal
disputes; it also signal[s] to men and women making 'private' decisions
regarding parenting responsibilities that the legal system expect[s] women to
do more parenting and to do it better than men."2 As long as courts award
custody to women on the grounds that "children naturally belong with their
mothers," feminists will have difficulty debunking the myth that a woman's
"natural" role is that of nurturer and caregiver to children.
B. Best Interests of the Child
Maternal preference evolved into the "best interests of the child" standard,
which is the most commonly used custody standard today. Commentators have
argued that the maternal preference operates to protect children's best interests
and that the two standards may have the same results.29 The Uniform
Marriage and Divorce Act ("UMDA") defined the best interests standard as
follows:
24. See, e.g., Ex Parte Devine, 398 So.2d 686 (Ala. 1981); Watts v. Watts, 77 Misc. 2d 178, 350
N.Y.S.2d 285 (1973); Pusey v. Pusey, 728 P.2d 117 (Utah 1986).
25. "Although many jurisdictions retain some type of maternal preference in awarding custody of very
young children, this preference has become largely a tie breaker." Neely, supra note 17, at 170.
26. Catharine MacKinnon has characterized the maternal preference as "ideologically injurious but
materially helpful" to women. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality UnderLaw, 100 YALE
L.J. 1281, 1293 (1991).
Martha Minow has also commented on the dilemma maternal preference poses for feminists:
"[Rieformers can invoke equality as a reason to end maternal preference in child-custody decisions at the
same time that critics cite the end of the maternal preference for child custody as a new disadvantage for
already disadvantaged women." Minow, supra note 9, at 914.
Abandonment of the maternal preference may prove antithetical to the interests of lesbians seeking
custody. "IF]or lesbians, who often face nonmaternal stereotypes in the courtroom, a legal presumption
that they could be good parents might be beneficial. If the maternal presumption were applied to lesbians,
it might make it easier for them to undermine the courts' stereotypes with respect to their fitness as
mothers." Ruth Colker, The Example of Lesbians: A Posthumous Reply to Professor Mary Joe Frug, 105
HARV. L. REV. 1084, 1092 (1992).
27. "[T]he rule lacks validity because it is unnecessary and perpetuates outdated stereotypes." Pusey,
728 P.2d at 120. See also Uviller, supra note 23, at 108 ("The legal presumption that children belong with
their mothers absent maternal unfitness reinforces the enduring stereotype of women as instinctive child
rearers, inherently unsuited for worldly pursuits.").
28. Mary Joe Frug, A Postmodern Feminist Legal Manifesto (An Unfinished Draft), 105 HARV. L.
REV. 1045, 1060-61 (1992).
29. See, e.g., UNIF. MARRIAGE & DIVORCE ACT § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561-596 (1970) [hereinafter
UMDA] (recommending use of "best interests" tests, but acknowledging that preference for mothers of
young children may be in children's best interests).
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The court shall determine custody in accordance with the best interests
of the child. The court shall consider all relevant factors including: (1)
the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; (2) the
wishes of the child as to his custodian; (3) the interaction and
interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, his siblings,
and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best
interests; (4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and
community; and (5) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved. The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian
that does not affect his relationship to the child.30
Several states adopted the best interests test as promulgated in the UMDA; at
almost every other state has adopted a similar test either by statute or by
judicial interpretation.32
The best interests standard is clearly in judicial and legislative favor at
present; nonetheless, it has numerous shortcomings. 3 First, the best interests
test requires the court to award custody to the "better parent;" this necessitates
reliance on the opinions of expert witnesses such as psychologists,
psychiatrists, social workers, and sociologists. 34 Days or weeks of testimony
must be heard from experts whose opinions are likely to do little more than
cancel each other out. 3  Moreover, experts generally conduct extensive
psychological tests and interviews of children and parents to provide a basis
for their testimony. 6 The costs associated with such testing and the resultant
expert testimony can easily become prohibitive for women, given that women
30. UMDA § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1970).
31. See, e.g., ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-332 (1991); KY. REV. STAT. § 403.270 (1984); MINN.
STAT. § 518.17 (Supp. 1992).
32. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.060 (1991); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9 (Michie 1978); N.D.
CENT. CODE § 14-09-06.1 (1991); WASH. REV. CODE § 26.10.100 (Supp. 1992); Quiner v. Quiner, 59
Cal. Rptr. 503, 509 (Cal. Ct. App. 1967) ("The law of this state makes it abundantly clear that the best
interests of the child is the polestar of decision in custody cases."); Feldman v. Feldman, 45 A.D.2d 320,
324, 358 N.Y.S.2d 507, 512 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) ("[O]ur sole concern is for the best interests of the
children.").
33. "[Tlhe broad best interests standard ... risks unwise results, stimulates litigation, permits
manipulation and abuse, and allows a level of judicial discretion that is difficult to reconcile with an historic
commitment to the rule of law. The costs of this system, especially for children, mothers and those with
the least resources to resist threats of litigation, are readily apparent." Gary Crippen, Stumbling Beyond
Best Interests of the Child: Reexamining Child Custody Standard-Setting in the Wake of Minnesota's Four
Year Experiment with the Primary Caretaker Preference, 75 MINN. L. REV. 427,499-500 (1990) (citations
omitted).
34. Neely, supra note 17, at 173.
35. Often, in custody hearings, each party to the dispute hires an expert (or experts) whose testimony
supports that party's custody petition. This testimony will, by its very nature, contradict the expert
testimony presented by the opposing party. See Uviller, supra note 23, at 125 ("[Nleither side will have
difficulty finding an 'eminent expert' to testify that the child will be 'better off' with him or her."). This
tendency for expert witnesses to play partisan roles is not limited to the realm of child custody litigation.
See generally David Bernstein, Out of the Fryeing Pan and into the Fire: The Expert Witness Problem in
Toxic Tort Litigation, 10 REV. LrrIG. 117 (1990); Expert Witnesses: Booming Business for the Specialists,
N.Y. TimES, July 5, 1987, at Al.
36. Neely, supra note 17, at 174.
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are likely to suffer significant financial loss as a result of divorce."
While extensive testing and lengthy judicial hearings in pursuit of the "best
interests of the child" often disadvantage women, so too does the significant
role of judicial discretion. Chief Justice Neely of the West Virginia Supreme
Court of Appeals commented on the implications of reliance on judicial
discretion in custody cases: "I cannot imagine an issue more subject to
personal bias than a decision about which parent is 'better.' . . . The decision
may hinge on the judge's memory of his or her own parents or on his or her
distrust of an expert whose eyes are averted once too often. "3 Judicial
discretion in the realm of family law is particularly troubling when viewed
from a feminist perspective. Too often, judges base their decisions regarding
family matters on anachronistic, gender-biased assumptions about women's
place in the family, their sexuality, and their rights outside the home.39 Until
judges actively seek to replace such antiquated, discriminatory modes of
judicial analysis with ungendered objectivity, women are better served by
custody standards that rely less heavily on judicial discretion.
The indeterminacy of the best interests test has negative implications for
women who settle their custody disputes before trial as well as for those who
seekjudicial resolutions. As commentators Mnookin and Kornhauser point out,
"[u]ncertainty has several important effects on the relative bargaining power
of the parties. . . . [I]f there is substantial variance among the possible
court-imposed outcomes, the relatively more risk-averse party is comparatively
disadvantaged. " ' When a woman wants custody of her children and her
ex-husband has no real interest in getting custody, he may nonetheless threaten
a custody battle to increase his bargaining power and reduce the amount of
child support he will have to pay.4'
37. See, e.g., Lenore J. Weitzman, The Economics of Divorce: Social and Economic Consequences
of Property. Alimony and Child Support Awards, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1181, 1251 (1981) (study finding
women's standard of living decreased by 73% in the first year after divorce); BUREAU OF LABOR
STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WOMEN AT WORK: A CHARTBOOK 26 (1983), cited in Neely, supra
note 17, at 179 (unemployment rates are much higher for single women with children than for married
persons with children, single women's median family income is less than half that of married couples, and
single women are five times more likely than married couples to live in poverty).
38. Neely, supra note 17, at 179. See also Uviller, supra note 23, at 124 ("A 'child's best interest'
comprises any and all of the deciding judge's child rearing prejudices.").
39. See, e.g., cases discussed infra Sections III-V.
40. Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: The Case of
Divorce, 88 YALE L.J. 950, 978-79 (1979). See also Neely, supra note 17, at 177-79 (describing how "the
unpredictability of divorce proceedings can be used to terrorize women . . ").
41. Neely, supra note 17, at 177. Justice Neely commented on this phenomenon, which he called the
"Solomon syndrome," in Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 362 (W. Va. 1981). The parent who actually
desires custody:
will be willing to sacrifice everything else in order to avoid the terrible prospect of losing the
child in the unpredictable process of litigation.... [Tihe parent who is most attached to the child
will be most willing to accept an inferior bargain .... [Tihe sacrificing parent generally loses
necessary support or alimony payments.
Id. This dilemma for women was also acknowleged in J.B. v. A.B.:
Regardless of whether a father actually wants custody or would be qualified for it, a demand for
custody will have an ominous effect upon a mother. As a high proportion of final divorce orders




In recent years, a number of states have adopted a presumption that joint
custody is generally in the children's best interests:
42
Joint custody attempts to solve some of the problems of sole custody
by providing the child with access to both parents and granting parents
equal rights and responsibilities regarding their children. . . . Under
a joint custody arrangement legal custody-the legal authority and
responsibility for making 'major' decisions regarding the child's
welfare-is shared at all times by both parents. Physical custody, the
logistical arrangement whereby the parents share the companionship
of the child and are responsible for 'minor' day-to-day decisions, may
be alternated in accordance with the needs of the parties and the
children.4'
Joint custody is at least as problematic as the best interests test. Numerous
commentators have argued that joint custody works only when an estranged
couple is willing and able to cooperate.' Nancy Polikoff has pointed out that:
[p]resumptions favoring joint custody upon divorce, regardless of who
has provided care and nurturance during the marriage, actually
discourage co-parenting during marriage by sending a clear message
to fathers that they have a right to intimate involvement with their
children upon divorce-if they choose to exercise it-no matter how
detached they are from the ongoing care of their children during the
marriage.4"
extensive negotiation, the threat of loss of children can be used as a terrorizing weapon to force
unjust and inadequate settlements.
242 S.E.2d 248, 254 n.4 (W. Va. 1978). Another commentator noted that:
[Mlany fathers who do not really want the responsibility of daily child care are using paternal
custody as a means of extortion. With the mother's custodial advantage less secure, many men
threaten their former wives with taking the children as a means of securing favorable financial
settlements, often in the form of truncated child support .... Since divorced men are generally
in a better financial position than their former wives to back up the custody threat with costly
litigation, women are acceding to unfavorable settlements rather than risk the loss of their
children.
Uviller, supra note 23, at 127.
42. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 4600.5(a) (West 1983); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56a(b) (1991);
IDAHO CODE § 32-717B(4) (1983); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1(A) (Michie 1978).
43. Beck v. Beck, 432 A.2d 63, 65-66 (N.J. 1981).
44. See, e.g., Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal Change in
Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727, 761 (1988) ("Joint custody can be a disaster if
parents are unwilling or unable to cooperate.") (citing Elissa S. Benedek & Richard S. Benedek, Joint
Custody: Solution orIllusion?, 136 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1540, 1541-42 (1979)); Joanne Schulman& Valerie
Pitt, Second Thoughts on Joint Child Custody: Analysis of Legislation and its Implications for Women and
Children, 12 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 539, 570-71 (1982); Uviller, supra note 23, at 128.
45. Polikoff, supra note 17, at 242.
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Joint custody fails to acknowledge parents' relative levels of day-to-day
involvement with their children during marriage. This failure forces parents
who have taken most of the responsibility for attending to their children's daily
needs to share custody with ex-spouses who previously may have provided
only sporadic assistance with child care. In this respect, joint custody is more
disadvantageous for women than for men, since American women still shoulder
most of the responsibility for childcare.' Finally, joint custody places
battered women in a particularly untenable position by forcing them to remain
in geographic proximity to the men who abused them.47 With a chilling lack
of foresight, joint custody ensures that battered women's lives remain
inextricably intertwined with those of their abusers.
III. THE PRIMARY CARETAKER STANDARD: WEST VIRGINIA, 1981-PRESENT
Each of the child custody standards discussed in the preceding Section has
its share of problems, and yet, the primary caretaker standard, the most recent
custody innovation, has not been widely considered or adopted. In this Section
I analyze the consequences of West Virginia's use of the primary caretaker
standard. The cases discussed demonstrate an alarming trend. Lower courts
repeatedly misapply-or simply fail to apply-the primary caretaker standard.
In case after case, the state supreme court has systematically reversed lower
court decisions that unjustifiably denied custody to primary caretaking mothers.
The state supreme court at times rectifies lower courts' misapplication of
the primary caretaker standard. However, it is impossible to assess the number
of women whose custody battles end in premature defeat because they can not
afford to seek appellate review. The cases that follow illustrate this central
problem with the primary caretaker standard. The standard must be modified
to prevent its misapplication by the lower courts. A custody standard that
requires women to endure several rounds of appeals before receiving justice
is far from utopian, regardless of how theoretically egalitarian it may be.
In 1981, West Virginia became the first state to adopt the primary caretaker
standard as the sole determinant of child custody.4" In Garska v. McCoy, the
state supreme court explained that it was in the child's best interests to grant
custody to his or her primary caretaker.
Since trial courts almost always award custody to the primary caretaker
anyway, establishment of certainty in this regard permits the issues of
46. See Neely, supra note 17, at 171-72. See also Fineman, supra note 44, at 773 ("[W]omen are
the primary nurturers of children in our society."); MARY ANN GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE
NEW PROPERTY 132 (1981) (regardless of whether women work outside the home or not, they usually serve
as primary caretaker).
47. Andi Rierden, Citing Abuse, Women Ask for Clemency in Killings, N.Y. TIMES, May 12, 1991,
§ 12 (Connecticut Weekly), at 13.
48. See Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357 (W. Va. 1981).
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alimony and support to stand upon their own legs and to be litigated
or settled upon the merits of relevant financial criteria, without
introducing into the equation the terrifying prospect of loss to the
primary caretaker of the children.49
The court went on to provide a fact-specific test for determining which parent
has been the primary caretaker:
In establishing which natural or adoptive parent is the primary
caretaker, the trial court shall determine which parent has taken
primary responsibility for, inter alia, the performance of the following
caring and nurturing duties of a parent: (1) preparing and planning of
meals; (2) bathing, grooming and dressing; (3) purchasing, cleaning,
and care of clothes; (4) medical care, including nursing and trips to
physicians; (5) arranging for social interaction among peers after
school, i. e. transporting to friends' houses or, for example, to girl or
boy scout meetings; (6) arranging alternative care, i. e. babysitting,
day-care, etc.; (7) putting child to bed at night, attending to child in
the middle of the night, waking child in the morning; (8) disciplining,
i. e. teaching general manners and toilet training; (9) educating, i. e.
religious, cultural, social, etc.; and, (10) teaching elementary skills,
i. e. reading, writing and arithmetic."0
Under the test enunciated by the Garska court, when custody disputes involve
children of tender years," t "there is a presumption in favor of the primary
caretaker parent, if he or she meets the minimum, objective standard for being
a fit parent . . . ."5' The court defined unfitness as "fail[ure] to provide:
emotional support; routine cleanliness; or nourishing food . . . ."
The virtues of the primary caretaker presumption have been extolled by
numerous commentators:
54
49. Id. at 361.
50. Id. at 363.
51. See infra text accompanying notes 82-84 for a discussion of the significance of an older child's
preference as it affects judicial application of the primary caretaker standard.
52. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 362.
53. Id. at n.9 (citing J.B. v. A.B., 242 S.E.2d 248 (V. Va. 1978)).
54. See, e.g., Fineman, supra note 44, at 770-774; IN THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 10, at 66-67
(praising the standard because it allows continuity of children's care); Neely, supra note 17, at 185-86;
O'Kelly, supra note 15, at 311-33; Polikoff, supra note 17, at 242-43. Cf. Uviller, supra note 23, at 129
(arguing for maternal presumption in favor of a woman "who has committed herself to care for home and
children, [yielding] only to a showing that in fact it has been the father who has assumed that role during
marriage.").
But see David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83
Mici. L. REV. 477, 527-38 (1984) (arguing that evidence in favor of primary caretaker standard is weak
where children are more than five years old); Sheri A. Ahl, Note, A Step Backward: The Minnesota
Supreme Court Adopts a "Primary Caretaker' Presumption in Child Custody Cases: Pikula v. Pikula, 70
MINN. L. REv. 1344 (1986) (criticizing Minnesota's adoption of primary caretaker standard).
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When properly applied, the primary caretaker parent presumption
reduces sharp practices in custody negotiation, prevents fathers and
mothers from being penalized on account of their gender, and avoids
custody battles that are so unwieldy and intrusive that they make the
lives of a divorcing couple and their children even more miserable than
they otherwise would be.55
At least in theory, the presumption solves many of the problems raised by
more common custody standards. 6 The primary caretaker standard promotes
gender equality in practice, as well as in theory, insofar as it recognizes that
in most American families, the mother takes primary responsibility for her
child's daily needs.5 7 The presumption renders the finances of the parties, and
the numerous other subjective factors that a court might otherwise consider
in determining a child's "best interests," irrelevant to the award of custody.5"
In theory, the presumption provides certainty of outcome,59 encouraging
private settlement of custody disputes, and thus diminishing the need for long,
painful, and costly custody battles in court. It also deters fathers from using
the threat of such custody battles to reduce the amount of child support they
will be asked to provide." Finally, the presumption recognizes that courts
are ill-equipped to determine what a child's best interests are, and instead
provides a set of specific factual determinations for courts to make before
awarding custody."1 Courts do not need expert testimony to determine which
parent has been a child's primary caretaker.
The primary caretaker standard appears to alleviate much of the
post-divorce suffering of women and their children. Proper application of the
standard could put women on a more equal footing with men vis-a-vis custody;
it also allows children to remain with the parent who has already proven able
55. David M. v. Margaret M., 385 S.E.2d 912, 915 (W. Va. 1989).
56. See supra text accompanying notes 16-47. See also IN THE BEST INTERESTS, Supra note 10, at
67:
The gender-related, the blood tie, and the primary caregiving parent preferences are all meant
to enable courts to identify who has been or is most likely to be responsible for the child's care.
But only the primary caregiver preference explicitly identifies the evidence essential for assuring
that this function will be served.
57. "[TIhe primary caretaker presumption avoids overvaluing fathers who do more than nothing and
undervaluing mothers who do less than everything." O'Kelly, supra note 15, at 521. See also supra note
46.
58. In Garska, the lower court awarded custody to the child's father on the grounds that he was "better
educated," "more intelligent," "better able to provide financial support," "ha[di a somewhat better
command of the English language," and "a better appearance and demeanor" than did the child's mother,
even though he had never lived with the child. Garska v. McCoy, 278 S.E.2d 357, 359 (W. Va. 1981).
59. "Under [the primary caretaker standard] a mother's lawyer can tell her that if she has been the
primary caretaker and is a fit parent, she has absolutely no chance of losing custody of very young
children." Neely, supra note 17, at 182. See also Crippen, supra note 33, at 429 (primary caretaker
preference was intended "to provide a 'bright line' standard for child custody decision-making and to
thereby reduce litigation and provide more predictable results.").
60. See Fineman, supra note 44, at 772; O'Kelly, supra note 15, at 521-24.
61. See O'Kelly, supra note .15, at 524-30 for a more complete discussion of the "judicial
manageability" of the primary caretaker standard.
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and willing to care for them. Moreover, the primary caretaker standard spares
women and children alike the emotional trauma and financial burden associated
with judicial application of the best interests test.62
In reality, the primary caretaker standard falls short of the ideal, as the
seemingly narrow exception for "unfit" primary caretakers effectively swallows
the rule in many cases.63 This exception has been read expansively by courts
at both the trial and appellate levels. Simple determinations of which parent
is the primary caretaker have become vicious battles over each spouse's
unfitness.6 In particular, the cases show a disturbing pattern of accusations
of sexual misconduct against the female primary caretaker. 65 For the purpose
of determining parental fitness, it seems that judicially defined "sexual
misconduct" is treated as wholly irrelevant when perpetrated by a man, but
entirely relevant (and often sufficient "proof" of unfitness) when committed
by a woman.
While West Virginia did not adopt the primary caretaker standard until
Garska, its accompanying parental unfitness exception came to light three years
earlier, in J.B. v. A.B." The lower court in J. awarded custody to the
father, notwithstanding the state's then-existing maternal preference,
presumably because it found the mother unfit. 7 The lower court based its
conclusion of unfitness on one alleged act of fellatio in a parked car at night.
The mother denied this accusation to no avail.6 "
62. Cf. Crippen, supra note 33, at 448 (citations omitted):
Although commentators generally emphasize the child's interests in controlling courtroom
disputes, mothers also benefit from decreased litigation. Courts and other observers have found
that mothers are more frequently the primary parent and are more often the party with fewer
resources for a courtroom proceeding. Thus, although the caretaker standard is facially
gender-neutral, by promoting less litigation, it actually favors mothers.
63. "We have noted that our very narrow exception to the primary caretaker rule has of late developed
a voracious appetite which, if left unchecked, will allow it to eat the rule." David M. v. Margaret M.,
385 S.E.2d 912, 915 (W. Va. 1989). But see Note, supra note 54, at 1371 (arguing that it is too difficult
to rebut the primary caretaker standard under current law-"with such a high rebuttal standard, it will be
nearly impossible for a judge to grant custody to the nonprimary caretaker parent . . ").
64. See, e.g., Novotny v. Novotny, 394 N.W.2d 256, 258 (Minn. Ct. App. 1986) (unfitness exception
to primary caretaker preference "encouraged the parties to bring up every character fault to deny custody.
Appellant attacked Sandra as an immature, self-centered hedonist. She complained that Jim drinks too much
and is foul-mouthed and slovenly.").
65. While I have not found a single case in which a male primary caretaker has been denied custody
on the basis of his sexual activity, numerous cases discussed in this article involve denial of custody to the
primary caretaking mother on the basis of her alleged "sexual misconduct."
In her study of sixty "custodially challenged" primary caretaker mothers (selected from across the
nation), Phyllis Chesler found that 48% of these women were custodially challenged because of their alleged
non-marital sexual behavior; moreover, in two-thirds of these cases, the alleged sexual activity occurred
after the breakup of their marriages. CHESLER, supra note 8, at 96.
66. 242 S.E.2d 248 (W. Va. 1978).
67. Id. at 250.
68. Id. at 251. According to the state supreme court:
The trial court relied upon one incident of sexual misconduct on the part of the wife as grounds
for awarding custody to the husband. The evidence indicates that very late one evening in
December 1974, during a period of trial separation between the parties, the [wife] and a male
companion parked their car in downtown Martinsburg and entered a bar. Later that same evening,
[shel and her male companion left the bar and returned to their parked car where they were
observed by the Ihusbandl, [his] cousin, and [his] minister, all of whom had followed the [wife]
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The state supreme court reversed, noting that this alleged incident was
"totally unrelated to the mother's relationship with her child," and that
"[e]xcept for this one incident, the record is devoid of any evidence that the
[mother] is an unfit parent."69 The court reasoned: "While the [mother's]
conduct in this case might be outrageous to some, reasonable men would differ
about whether it were sufficiently outrageous, per se, to lead us to conclude
she is an unfit custodian, given the lack of consensus about these matters in
contemporary society."7' The court concluded that in order for a parent's
sexual conduct to bear upon his or her fitness as a parent, "the conduct must
be so outrageous that reasonable men cannot differ about its deleterious affect
[sic] upon the child."71
When Garska replaced the maternal presumption with the primary caretaker
standard, the law in West Virginia did not change regarding the relevance of
a parent's sexual activity. Theoretically, absent a "deleterious effect" upon her
children, a woman's sexual activity is not relevant to her fitness as a parent.72
Lower courts in West Virginia have nonetheless continued to find women unfit
parents on the basis of their alleged sexual behavior where no harm to the
children is demonstrated. In S.H. v. R.L.H. ,7 the appellate court reversed
the trial court's custody award to the mother in part because "the appellant
mother had an affair with a man who is now her husband before she married
him .... -7' Notwithstanding the trial court's finding that the children's
mother had been their primary caretaker,75 the supreme court affirmed the
lower court's decision, stating:
[T]he remarriage of a child's guardian or a permanent relationship in
which a child's guardian and another adult share living quarters
constitutes a significant change in circumstances and upon proper
motion, warrants inquiry by the trial court into the relationship between
the child and the new adult .... However, remarriage or a relationship
with another adult, per se, raises no presumption against continued
custody in the parent who was originally awarded custody.76
Justice Neely's opinion in S.H. v. R.L.H. clashes with his earlier decisions
to the area without her knowledge. Although [she] denies it, the weight of the evidence is that
she committed the act of fellatio with her male companion late that night in the parked car, after
leaving the bar.
69. Id. at 255.
70. Id. at 256.
71. Id.
72. See, e.g., Isaacs v. Isaacs, 358 S.E.2d 833, 835 (V. Va. 1987); M.S.P. v. P.E.P., 358 S.E.2d
442, 445 (W. Va 1987).
73. 289 S.E.2d 186 (W. Va. 1982).
74. Id. at 189. The court's use of the term "affair" to characterize this relationship is puzzling, since
it appears that neither the appellant nor her future husband were married when their relationship began.
75. Id. at 188.
76. Id. at 191.
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in J.B. v. A.B. and Garska.7' In S.H. v. R.L.H., the trial court found that
the children's mother had been their primary caretaker, and did not find any
evidence that she had failed to provide them with emotional support, routine
cleanliness, or nourishing food;78 nonetheless, the supreme court upheld the
lower court's decision to change custody from the mother to the father.
Justice Neely's explanation for his decision is unenlightening.", He does
not indicate whether living with another woman, living with a male relative,
or living with a man who is not a sexual partner would warrant inquiry into
a woman's parental fitness. Given that most women suffer economically after
divorce,' it is unfair to punish those who may have no alternative but to
share housing with other adults for financial reasons.8' Economic hardship
and the sacrifices it forces upon women have no bearing on women's parenting
ability. Courts should not be permitted to penalize women for living with other
adults unless there is specific evidence that such a living arrangement harms
the children at issue.
An additional facet to S.H. v. R.L.H. may explain Justice Neely's
willingness to depart from the Garska unfitness test in affirming the custody
change from mother to father. The supreme court's opinion in S.H. v. R.L.H.
emphasized that the oldest of the three children, who was fourteen at the time,
preferred to live with her father.82 Judicial adherence to the custodial
preference of older children is not unprecedented. In Garska, Justice Neely
stated, "Where a child is old enough to formulate an opinion about his or her
own custody the trial court is entitled to receive such opinion and accord it
such weight as he feels appropriate."83
Reliance by courts on older children's preferences increases the likelihood
that parents will compete for their children's favor. In addition, encouraging
even older children to choose between two parents may add to the anxiety and
stress inescapable after divorce. While I do not explore at length these and
other concerns raised by judicial reliance on a child's preference, I suggest that
the primary caretaker standard as amended in Section VI should be uniformly
applied regardless of the age of the minor child involved."
Following S.H. v. R.L.H., West Virginia courts continued to deem women
"unfit" parents on the basis of their living arrangements. In Porter v.
77. See supra text accompanying note 71.
78. 289 S.E.2d at 191.
79. See supra text accompanying note 76.
80. See supra note 37.
81. See infra text accompanying notes 95-97.
82. 289 S.E.2d at 188.
83. Garska, 278 S.E.2d at 363.
84. See Fineman, supra note 44, at 771-72:
1 would apply the rule to all contested custody cases, not just to those involving children of
'tender years' .... [Llimiting the rule to [young children] unrealistically assumes that nurturing
ends when a child begins school. This limitation would also send the message that if a parent
fails to nurture during a child's early years, he need not worry, because there will be no negative
consequences with respect to later custody determinations.
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Porter,8" the lower court found the mother unfit on the sole ground that she
"had been living with a man without benefit of marriage in the marital
home."" Prior to the first custody hearing, each parent had been living with
another adult, 7 and the children had spent time in both homes under these
conditions. The lower court offered no explanation for its assumption that an
unmarried woman's cohabitation rendered her an unfit parent while a man in
the same situation was not unfit.8
Finding no evidence that the children's mother "neglected the children or
engaged in sexual activity in their presence,"89 the supreme court reversed
the lower court's decision, stating:
[A] change of custody.is not justified where, as here, the only basis for
the court's decision is the existence of an extramarital relationship on
the part of the parent originally awarded custody. There must also be
a showing that the parent's relationship with another adult has a
deleterious effect upon the child and that the child will materially
benefit from the change of custody."
Like the primary caretaker standard as a whole, this refinement of the
parental unfitness exception sounds better than it is. As written, it disallows
a finding of unfitness based solely on the existence of a woman's intimate
nonmarital relationship. With the new exception, a court would be able to find
unfitness only upon a showing of a nexus between this relationship and some
harm it has caused the child. In practice, however, this "amendment" to the
parental unfitness exception has fallen prey to the same abuse of judicial
discretion as its precursor. Because the supreme court in Porter did not
precisely define its terms (i.e., "deleterious effect" and "materially benefit"),
lower court judges were once again left to decipher the meaning of these
all-important phrases for themselves. And, not surprisingly, cases following
in Porter's wake illustrate lower courts' tendency to read these terms so
broadly as to render them essentially meaningless.
West Virginia trial judges continued to deny women custody on the basis
of their adult relationships without first finding that these relationships had a
deleterious effect on their children. In Stacy v. Stacy,91 the lower court failed
85. 298 S.E.2d 130 (W. Va. 1982).
86. Id. at 131. The father's petition to modify custody accused the mother of raising the children in
an "immoral atmosphere." Id.
87. The children's father remarried after filing a petition to modify the custody order, but before the
hearing on said petition took place. Id.
88. "It is permissible for fathers to have nonmarital sexual relationships without jeopardizing their
custody rights. However, if a woman does so, she may well lose custody." Laurie Woods, Vicki Been &
Joanne Schulman, Sex and Economic Discrimination in Child Custody Awards, 16 CLEARINGHOUSE REV.
1130, 1133 (1983).
89. 298 S.E.2d at 132.
90. Id.
91. 332 S.E.2d 260 (W. Va. 1985).
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to apply the primary caretaker standard; it simply determined that the mother
was an adulterer and thus an unfit parent, and awarded custody to the
father.92 The supreme court reversed, directing the lower court that "to be
a fit parent a person must . . . refrain from grossly immoral behavior under
circumstances that would affect the child. "93
In Bickler v. Bickler,94 the lower court denied a mother custody, even
though she was the child's primary caretaker, because she was living with a
man. 95 Both the woman and her male co-habitee testified that they were
sharing living quarters solely for economic reasons, and that they did not
engage in sexual activity with one another.9" Nonetheless, the woman lost
custody of her child due to the lower court judge's predisposition to disbelieve
her in matters concerning her sex life. According to the supreme court, "the
evidence that a sexual relationship existed between the appellant and [her male
co-habitee] was far from convincing. Moreover, the circuit judge indicated at
the hearing a predisposition to disbelieve any assertion that a man and a
woman would share living quarters without engaging in sexual relations.,97
The supreme court reversed the circuit court's decision, stating that the
mother's unfitness had not been proven by "a clear preponderance of the
evidence."98 The court found that the lower court had erred in declaring the
mother an unfit parent because:
[tlhere was no evidence that the appellant engaged in sexual activity
in the presence of her daughter or that she neglected the child because
of her relationship with [her male co-habitee] . . . [n]or is there any
evidence that [the male co-habitee] mistreated the child or that she
disliked or was afraid of him."
According to the supreme court in Bickler, the only considerations relevant
to parental fitness were whether the woman's sexual activity took place in front
92. Id. at 261 ("There was no finding of which parent was the primary caretaker and, indeed, most
of the evidence at the final hearing did not go to the issue of which parent took primary responsibility for
the children's care but to the allegedly adulterous behavior of the appellant.").
In Isaacs v. Isaacs, a remarkably similar case, the lower court awarded custody to Timothy Isaacs
on the grounds that Tammy Isaacs had committed adultery during their marriage ("the circuit judge was
particularly concerned with [Tammy's] apparent sexual misconduct when he made the custody award..
. . ). 358 S.E.2d 833, 835 (W. Va. 1987). No evidence was offered to prove that the couple's child had
been adversely affected by her mother's alleged sexual misconduct, nor that Tammy was an unfit parent.
For these reasons, the supreme court reversed and awarded custody to Tammy. Id. at 836.
93. Stacy, 332 S.E.2d at 262.
94. 344 S.E.2d 630 (W. Va. 1986).
95. Id. at 631.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 632. At least one member of the supreme court shared the lower court's view. See id. at
633, n.2 (Brotherton, J., dissenting) ("While not absolute proof, a man and a woman of similar age living
together is certainly evidence of a sexual relationship and would at least be strong enough that the trial
judge could base an opinion on it.").
98. Id. at 631.
99. Id. at 632.
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of her daughter, whether the woman was a negligent parent, and whether the
child had a good relationship with the male co-habitee.
The West Virginia Supreme Court again reversed a lower court decision
in M.S.P. v. P.E.P.'° In M.S.P., the lower court awarded custody to the
children's father, even though it did not find that their mother, who had been
their primary caretaker, was an unfit parent.'° The lower court's justification
for its decision was "[t]hat the moral atmosphere which exists in the home of
[the mother], resulting from visits of her close friends, who are bi-sexual or
homosexual, does not appear to be a fit and proper place for the children to
reside. "102 The court based its opinion solely on the husband's accusation
that his ex-wife was involved with a man who had previously had a
homosexual relationship.0" The husband presented no proof of this
allegation; nor was there any evidence that the children had been exposed to
or influenced by any homosexual conduct."° The husband explained his
motivation for seeking custody as follows: "I don't like to think that my
children are exposed to someone that is a bisexual or homosexual, whatever
he is, I don't want my children exposed to this. "105
The supreme court reversed and awarded custody of the children to their
mother.1"s Relying in part on its opinion in Bickler, the court stated that
"[a]dverse effects upon the children must be demonstrated before a divorcing
parent's subsequent associations, standing alone, can be the basis for finding
a parent who is the primary caretaker, unfit to have custody of her minor
children." 7
In David M. v. Margaret M.,1 8 the West Virginia supreme court
enunciated a new test for parental fitness:
To be a fit parent, a person must: (1) feed and clothe the child
appropriately; (2) adequately supervise the child and protect him or her
from harm; (3) provide habitable housing; (4) avoid extreme discipline,
child abuse, and other similar vices; and (5) refrain from immoral
behavior under circumstances that would affect the child. ,o"
The lower court in this case awarded custody to David, even though Margaret
100. 358 S.E.2d 442 (W. Va. 1987).
101. Id. at 444.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. The court's assumption that interaction with a bisexual was per se harmful to the children clearly
exposes its general intolerance toward homosexuality and bisexuality.
105. Id. at 445.
106. Id. at 447.
107. Id. at 445. See also Rowsey v. Rowsey, 329 S.E.2d 57, 60 (W. Va. 1985) (state supreme court
instructs lower court: "The fact that a custodial parent and her children are in the presence of a woman
who is reputed to be a lesbian is not a ground for changing custody to the noncustodial parent.").
108. 385 S.E.2d 912 (W. Va. 1989).
109. Id. at 924.
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had been their child's primary caretaker.' The court found that Margaret
was not a fit parent because she had committed adultery three times in two
years."' Applying its newly established test, the supreme court reversed,
stating that "restrained normal sexual behavior does not make a parent unfit.
The law does not attend to traditional concepts of immorality in the abstract,
but only to whether the child is a party to, or is influenced by, such
behavior."112 The supreme court appeared to sever the previously assumed
connection between a woman's sexual activity and her fitness as a parent.
Several pages later in its opinion, however, the court stated that either
"evidence establishing that the child was harmed or that the conduct per se was
so outrageous, given contemporary standards, as to call into question her
fitness as a parent" would warrant a finding of unfitness.
11 3
The David M. test for parental fitness is more precise than either the J.B.
v. A.B. test1 4 or the Porter test.1 5 The fact that each test has been more
specific than the last suggests a concern that vague language left too much to
lower courts' discretion. While the David M. test does remove some of the
ambiguity inherent in earlier fitness tests by laying out five qualifications a
parent must meet to be found "fit," the fifth element of this test merely revisits
the very problem the test as a whole was designed to avoid. By defining fit
parents as those who "refrain from immoral behavior under circumstances that
would affect the child,"" 6 the test invites judges to decide for themselves
what constitutes "immoral behavior." The supreme court in David M. did not
attempt to specify what "immoral behavior" would warrant a finding of
unfitness; it merely stated that Margaret M.'s behavior did not render her
unfit.
As the cases discussed in this Section demonstrate, lower court judges in
West Virginia have seized upon such broad terms as "immoral behavior" as
a means to criticize and punish women (through denial of custody) for behavior
many people would not consider immoral. The supreme court in David M.
could have prevented this result by omitting the fifth element of its fitness test;
instead, it proved itself unable or unwilling to repudiate what it referred to as
"traditional concepts of immorality. 1""' By stating that particularly
"outrageous" conduct could, by itself, warrant a denial of custody to a primary
caretaker, without identifying which conduct would be sufficiently
"outrageous" to meet this standard, the court preserved the connection between
110. Id. at 914.
111. Id. at 924. "Mrs. M. testified that two of the instances occurred about midnight when the child
was asleep and the third occurred after the child and his stepbrother left to visit a neighbor and was
concluded before the children returned home." Id. at 928.
112. Id. at 924.
113. Id. at 928 (first emphasis added).
114. See supra text accompanying note 71.
115. See supra text accompanying note 90.
116. 385 S.E.2d at 924.
117. Id.
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sexual behavior and parental fitness.
Nevertheless, in its most recent opinions on the subject, the West Virginia
supreme court has used increasingly strong language to reverse lower court
decisions denying custody to primary caretaking women on the basis of their
"sexual misconduct." In Dottie S. v. Christopher S. ,"' the court reversed
a lower court ruling which granted custody to the child's paternal
grandparents. The lower court's decision was apparently based on its belief
that the child's mother had been involved in an incestuous relationship with
her half-brother, and that this rendered her an unfit parent." 9 The supreme
court noted, however, that the woman denied having had a sexual relationship
with the man in question and that she was unaware of their familial relationship
when they met for the first time as adults. 120 Moreover, there was evidence
to suggest that the man was not, in fact, her half-brother."' The supreme
court invoked J.B. v. A.B. and admonished, "[M]ere sexual misconduct which
does not impact upon [the mother's] willingness or ability to be emotionally
and physically supportive of the child does not constitute unfitness to have
custody of the child." 122
Judith R. v. Hey" is perhaps the most extreme and most disturbing
example of a judicial pattern now common in West Virginia. The West
Virginia supreme court reversed a lower court decision denying custody to a
primary caretaking mother because of her alleged or actual sexual activity.
Judith R. sued the lower court judge, who had instructed that she would lose
custody of her daughter if she did not, within thirty days, either marry the man
with whom she lived or move out of their shared home. 124 Judith R. also
alleged that Judge Hey had appeared on the nationally-televised program
"Crossfire," where he publicized his views on Judith R.'s custody battle."a
118. 408 S.E.2d 46 (W. Va. 1991).
119. Id. at 48.
120. Id.
121. Id. at 49.
122. Id. See also Kenneth L.W. v. Tamyra S.W., 408 S.E.2d 625, 629-30 (W. Va. 1991):
[A]lthough the circuit court explicitly stated that it did not base its decision on the adulterous
conduct of the [mother], a review of the record indicates that the overwhelming thrust of the
evidence related to such conduct. The issue of such conduct was repeatedly belabored in an
apparent attempt'to discredit the [mother] as a parent. That fact, coupled with the family law
master's finding relating marital misconduct to parental fitness (which was adopted by the circuit
court) leads us to the conclusion that indeed the custody decision did hinge on the misconduct
issue.... We fail to perceive any evidence indicating that the adulterous conduct of the [mother]
had a deleterious effect on [her children] and therefore refuse to permit such conduct to bear upon
our decision.
123. 405 S.E.2d 447 (W. Va. 1991).
124. Id. at 449.
125. Id. at 452. During the course of the program, Judge Hey commented, "I don't think it is in the
welfare, the best interests of a child 13 years old to see her mother sleeping with a man that is not her
father, and next week there may be a different man in the house, and the third week there may be a third
one." Id. at 452 n.4. As the supreme court noted, these comments made by the judge on "Crossfire" were
.adverse to [Judith's] reputation, character, and motivations ... for which there was no evidentiary basis
whatsoever and which seem to indicate a bias and prejudice against [Judith]. Since no evidence was taken




Both Judge Hey's television appearance and his custody order in the case
indicated an unabashed bias against Judith simply because she cohabitated with
a man. As the supreme court acknowledged, "[n]o findings of fact warranting
a finding of unfitness were set forth by Judge Hey .... [The custody] order
was grounded merely on the premise that the court would not 'tolerate' Judith
R.'s conduct."126
Judge Hey's answer to Judith R.'s complaint demonstrates his intolerance
in this regard. He alleged:
that petitioner and 'her paramour' are violating criminal and moral law
on a daily basis ... ; sexual promiscuity on the petitioner's part...;
[and that] the cohabitation of petitioner with another person is an
'illegal and reprehensible activity which is obviously occurring in the
presence of and affecting a teen-age daughter who should be receiving
lessons in morality and chastity rather (than) a home study course in
promiscuity.' 127
Judge Hey's conduct in this case serves as a poignant reminder that judges
continue to rely on their own morality codes in denying women custody of
their children. While we may take solace in the West Virginia Supreme Court's
systematic reversal of such erroneous decisions, at least one member of that
state's highest court shares Judge Hey's viewpoint on cases like Judith R. In
his partial dissent, Justice Brotherton opined, "The majority is clearly wrong
in permitting the fourteen-year-old child . . to remain in the custody of her
mother . . . while she is openly cohabitating with a man and his family."12
Arguing that cohabitation should be considered as evidence of parental
unfitness, he continued, "If Judith R. really loved her child, she would have
provided a stable family environment, even if she had to live alone. Her
sacrifice would be bolstered by the knowledge that her child would be exposed
to proper principles and conduct that would be building blocks for her
life." 129
IV. THE PRIMARY CARETAKER STANDARD: MINNESOTA, 1985-1989
In 1985, Minnesota followed West Virginia's lead and abandoned its "best
interests of the child" standard 30 in favor of the primary caretaker standard
in Pikula v. Pikula."' As the cases that follow demonstrate, women in
Minnesota were no better served by courts' discriminatory implementation of
126. Id. at 450.
127. Id. at 453.
128. Id. at 455 (Brotherton, J., dissenting).
129. Id. at 455-56 (Brotherton, J., dissenting).
130. See, e.g., Berndt v. Berndt, 292 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 1980).
131. 374 N.W.2d 705 (Minn. 1985).
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the standard than were their sisters in West Virginia. In Pikula, the trial court
awarded custody to Dana, the father of two children, even though he was an
alcoholic who verbally and physically abused Kelly, his wife, in his daughters'
presence. 132 At one point, shortly before Kelly moved out of the marital
home, Dana threatened to keep her there and to take the children away "so
she would know what it was like to be alone."' Kelly moved into a battered
women's shelter shortly after this threat, where she remained until the
trial. 134
All of the foregoing evidence, as well as the recommendations of three
social workers,' 35 failed to dissuade the trial court from awarding custody
to Dana.136 The court's opinion did not address the effects of Dana's
alcoholism and wife battering on the children and offered no support for the
finding that Kelly "would subject the children to considerable uncertainty and
instability in home, community, culture, persons and religion" and that her
"behavior and practices of child rearing as well as her interest in her children
are at least subject to serious question. " 137
Reversing the trial court decision, the appellate court noted that "the trial
court had penalized Kelly for the divorce and remarriage of her parents, for
actions and attitudes of other close relatives, and for her involvement with
persons concerned with women's issues, without finding that any of these
factors affected the relationship between children and mother. " ", In its
discretionary review of the case, the state supreme court agreed, noting also
that "[1]egal rules governing custody awards have generally incorporated
evaluations of parental fitness replete with ad hoc judgments on the beliefs,
lifestyles, and perceived credibility of the proposed custodian."' 39
The Minnesota supreme court in Pikula sought to redress this problem of
subjective, biased judicial decision-making in child custody cases by replacing
132. One such assault took place in front of other adults as well, who felt the incident was serious
enough to report it to the police. Id. at 707.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 708.
135. Id.
136. The primary reason for this decision seems to have been that Dana had a large extended family,
which "surrounded the girls with a social milieu imbued with the 'traditional' values, shared and fostered
by Dana." Id. at 710. While alcohol abuse and wife battering may be "traditional values" in some families,
the trial court's acceptance of these activities defies comprehension.
137. Id. Kelly was seventeen years old when her first daughter was born. While she did not have a
job outside the home, she had managed to complete high school while raising two babies and caring for
the home. Dana accused Kelly at trial of disciplining the children too severely and of being "ambivalent"
about her role as a mother. Id. at 707. The evaluations of three social workers contradicted this testimony.
In observing Kelly with her daughters, all three concluded that Kelly was affectionate towards them and
did not use excessive discipline. Id. at 708.
138. Id. at 709. The appellate court's reference to "persons concerned with women's issues" suggests
that the trial court was actually punishing Kelly for seeking refuge from Dana at a battered women's shelter.
See also Woods, et al., supra note 88, at 1134 ("[Blattered women are penalized by courts for lifestyles
which result directly from the physical abuse.").
139. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 713.
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the best interests of the child standard with the primary caretaker standard."4
The court adopted the criteria set out by the Garska court for determining
which parent is the primary caretaker.' 4 ' However, it defined the parental
fitness exception somewhat differently: "[T]he primary parent should be given
custody unless it is shown that the child's physical or emotional health is likely
to be endangered or impaired by being placed in the primary parent's
custody."' 42 The Minnesota exception for parental unfitness was even less
clearly defined than the Garska exception' since it failed to provide any
criteria for courts to use in determining whether a child's health is endangered
by his or her parent's conduct.
Minnesota cases arising after Pikula illustrate lower courts' inability or
unwillingness to apply the primary caretaker standard and its nebulous
exception in a non-discriminatory manner. In Tanghe v. Tanghe,'" the trial
court awarded custody of the couple's five children to Mark, their father, on
the grounds that Debra, their mother, while primarily responsible for the
children's physical needs, was incapable of providing adequately for the
emotional needs of the four eldest daughters. 145 The court found that Debra
verbally and physically disciplined the children severely,'" although it paid
little attention either to Mark's admission that he had spanked one of the
children too hard (the child received welts on his body as a result of this
spanking), or to the fears expressed by two of the children to the social worker
about being spanked by Mark. 47 The testimony of a social worker, Debra's
psychologist, and the children's guardian ad litem stressed Debra's emotional
instability, while, as the appellate court noted, "[n] one of the expert witnesses
investigated reports that [Mark] had physically abused [Debra] on
approximately 20 occasions. The information was provided in a letter from a
counselor at a domestic treatment center, where a treatment program for
[Mark] had been outlined. He did not complete the program.'"4
The trial court failed to identify the possible connection between Debra's
"emotional instability," as described by the guardian ad litem, and the fact that
Mark frequently assaulted her. 14 Rather than being emotionally unstable,
140. "[WMhen both parents seek custody of a child too young to express a preference, and one parent
has been the primary caretaker of the child, custody should be awarded to the primary caretaker absent
a showing that that parent is unfit to be the custodian." Id. at 712.
141. Id. at 713. See also supra text accompanying note 50.
142. Pikula, 374 N.W.2d at 714.
143. See supra text accompanying note 50.
144. 400 N.W.2d 389 (Minn. Ct. App. 1987).
145. Id. at 392.
146. Evidence was introduced at the dissolution hearing concerning three acts of physical discipline
over a five-year period. Id. at 390.
147. Id. at 391.
148. Id.
149. Additionally, the court failed to consider the fact that some battered women may hit their children
more frequently than do other women as a result of the abuse they suffer. See LENORE E. WALKER, THE
BATrERED WOMAN SYNDROME 150 (1984) ("Eight times as many women report using physical discipline
on their children while with their batterers than when living alone or in a nonbattering relationship."). See
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Debra may have instead exhibited the characteristics of a woman who
reasonably feared being beaten by her husband. The trial court described her
as "suffer[ing] from a lack of self-esteem" and displaying a "dependent
personality. "15 These characteristics may be more appropriately attributed
to Mark's repeated abuse of Debra than to some generalized disability or
deficiency of Debra herself.15' Not only was Debra forced to suffer Mark's
abuse for the years during which they lived together; the trial court then forced
her to give up her five daughters to her abuser because his beatings had
rendered her "emotionally unstable." The court also gave no recognition to
the fact that Debra had received psychological therapy,'52 while Mark had
failed to complete his recommended treatment program for domestic
abuse. 5 ' Finally, the court ignored the very real connection between Mark's
physical abuse of Debra and the increased likelihood that, as custodial parent,
he would abuse his daughters as well.1
5 4
The appellate court reversed and remanded the case, directing the trial
court as follows:
Possibly a parent who serves as a full-time homemaker and child
caregiver occasionally may invoke different disciplinary techniques than
a parent who works both full and part-time jobs and is not called upon
to provide constant or consistent discipline. In addressing the emotional
stability of the parties, the trial court should also make specific findings
regarding [Mark's] alleged abuse of [Debra] and alleged inappropriate
discipline of the minor children. '55
The appellate court in this case acknowledged the trial court's misapplication
also Jean Giles-Sims, A Longitudinal Study of Battered Children of Battered Wives, 34 FAMILY RELATIONS
205 (1985) (citing MURRAY STRAUS ET AL., BEHIND CLOSED DOORS: VIOLENCE IN THE AMERICAN
FAMILY (1980) (battered woman is twice as likely as non-battered woman to abuse her own child)).
150. Tanghe, 400 N.W.2d at 392.
151. See, e.g., WALKER, supra note 149, at 82 ("[Tihe battered women in our study were highly
depressed.. . .). But see id. at 80 (study found battered women's self-esteem was surprisingly high: "This
finding of positive self-image is unusual and inconsistent with current theories about battered women.").
Researchers have noted that a uniform characteristic of battering men is "an overwhelming need to
control the woman." Id. at 129. Thus, it should not be surprising that battered women like Debra adopt
defensive postures (i.e., the appearance of dependence) in an effort to minimize future abuse. Moreover,
both the social worker and Debra's psychologist testified that she had begun making progress emotionally
after she separated from Mark, which suggests that whatever emotional problems she had resulted from
her relationship with him.
152. 400 N.W.2d at 391.
153. Id. at 393.
154. See. e.g., WILLIAM STACEY & ANSON SHUPE, THE FAMILY SECRET: DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN
AMERICA 63-64 (1983) (45% of the children of battered women studied had been physically abused and/or
seriously neglected-authors noted that this figure is 1500% higher than national average in general
population); WALKER, supra note 149, at 59 (53 % of approximately 400 battering men studied abused their
children as well as their partners); David Finkelhor, Common Features of Family Abuse, in THE DARK
SIDE OF FAMILIES 17, 22 (David Finkelhor, et al. eds., 1983) (men who batter their wives are more prone
than non-batterers to abuse their children as well).
155. 400 N.W.2d at 394.
[Vol. 4: 291
Primary Caretaker Standard
of the primary caretaker standard as enunciated in Pikula.'56 However, the
emotional distress that this ordeal caused Debra must have been enormous and
was largely unnecessary. Had the trial court obeyed the Pikula mandate,
Debra's ordeal might have ended sooner. Instead, her case was heard by a
court that displayed no concern for her suffering at Mark's hands, but
concluded only that she might be too emotionally unstable to care for her
children. Moreover, she had to live with the fear that Mark might hurt her
daughters as he had hurt her so many times before. The appellate court's
reversal and remand of the trial court's decision could not expunge the
antecedent proceedings, which were protracted and undoubtedly compounded
Debra's suffering. 157
In Sinsabaugh v. Heinerscheid,58 the appellate court held that the trial
court had not erred in failing to apply the primary caretaker standard, given
that three years had passed between the parties' separation and the custody
hearing. 59 Although neither the trial court nor the appellate court found
Nancy Sinsabaugh to be an unfit parent, both were greatly concerned by the
fact that she suffered from depression and anxiety and was under a therapist's
care."6° Neither court investigated the cause of Nancy's emotional distress,
even though her depression and anxiety may well have resulted from her
divorce, and might have diminished over time.16 Neither court mentioned
any negative impact Nancy's emotional state had on her child.'62
On the other hand, both courts looked favorably upon Paul Heinerscheid's
remarriage to a woman who had two children of her own and who "quit her
job to spend more time caring for the children. "163 The courts' reliance on
this factor is particularly troubling in light of the fact that many more men than
women remarry after divorce. " If remarriage is accepted as a legitimate
factor for courts to consider in making custody determinations, women who
are primary caretakers will nonetheless be denied custody of their children
because other women have effectively "replaced" them as mothers.'65
156. See supra note 141 and accompanying text.
157. Debra was lucky that financial constraints did not prevent her from pursuing an appeal. Legal
fees are often staggering, and one can only surmise that many women who are wrongfully denied custody
at the trial level simply cannot afford to appeal. To get a sense of how large legal fees are in similar
custody disputes, see Sinsabaugh v. Heinerscheid, 428 N.W.2d 476, 481 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (the
mother's legal fees for the trial and her appeal totalled $30,960, while the father's totalled $50,000).
158. Id.
159. Id. at 479.
160. Id. at 480.
161. In fact, Nancy admitted to being depressed and anxious in 1984, the year in which she and Paul
were separated, and she further testified that she was improving at the time of trial. id.
162. Nancy's psychologist "found her an emotionally stable person well suited for parenting." Id.
163. Id. at 478.
164. For every 100 divorced men who remarry, only about 60 divorced women remarry. See
NATIONAL CENTER FOR HEALTH STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, VITAL
STATISTICS OF THE UNITED STATES 1978, VOLUME Ill-MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE, 1-10 (1982).
165. Accord In re Custody of Temos, 450 A.2d 111, 125 (Pa. Super. 1982) ("By awarding the
children to the father the lower court did not ensure that they would have any more time with the father
than they now have with the mother. It only ensured that they would have a few hours a day with the
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Furthermore, single women often find it impossible to stay home all day with
their children, because financial constraints force them to work outside the
home. Courts should redress this problem by ordering and enforcing more
realistic child support payments, not by awarding custody to men whose new
wives can afford to stay home because their husbands work.
V. USE OF THE "HYBRID" PRIMARY CARETAKER STANDARD
While two states have determined custody using solely the primary
caretaker standard, others have adopted a hybrid form of the primary caretaker
and the best interests of the child standards. In such schemes, the identity of
the child's primary caretaker is one of many factors considered in reaching an
overall determination of the best interests of the child. As the cases in this
section demonstrate, this hybrid standard has done little to prevent judges from
acting in accordance with the same biased and unjustifiable presumptions
discussed above. The following cases demonstrate that the primary caretaker
standard must be made narrower and more absolute if it is to operate in a non-
discriminatory fashion. Using it as one of numerous factors renders it
ineffective.
A. Minnesota's Shift to a Hybrid Standard
In 1989, the Minnesota legislature created a statutory child custody
standard which nullified the judicially mandated primary caretaker
standard.'" In its place, the legislature adopted a modified "best interests
of the child" standard, elaborating twelve factors courts should consider in
deciding custody cases. The child's primary caretaker is one of these twelve
factors.167 One of the legislature's goals in enacting the new law was to
abolish use of the primary caretaker presumption as the sole determinant for
child custody. According to the statute, "[t]he court may not use one factor
father's wife instead of with a babysitter."). Phyllis Chesler has noted that judges' willingness to accept
men's mothers or new wives as "mother substitutes" illustrates judicial devaluation of maternal labor, "as
if any female surrogate is the same as the mother . " CHESLER, supra note 8, at 256.
166. MINN. STAT. § 518.17 (Supp. 1992).
167. The statute spells out the following twelve factors:
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to custody; (2) the reasonable preference of the
child, if the court deems the child to be of sufficient age to express preference; (3) the child's
primary caretaker; (4) the intimacy of the relationship between each parent and the child; (5) the
interaction and interrelationship of the child with a parent or parents, siblings, and any other
person who may significantly affect the child's best interests; (6) the child's adjustment to home,
school, and community; (7) the length of time the child has lived in a stable, satisfactory
environment and the desirability of maintaining continuity; (8) the permanence, as a family unit,
of the existing or proposed custodial home; (9) the mental and physical health of all individuals
involved; (10) the capacity and disposition of the parties to give the child love, affection, and
guidance, and to continue educating and raising the child in the child's culture and religion or
creed, if any; (11) the child's cultural background; and (12) the effect on the child of the actions
of an abuser, if related to domestic abuse ... that has occurred between the parents.
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to the exclusion of all others."16 A 1990 amendment to the statute added
an even stronger admonition against judicial over-reliance on the primary
caretaker. 
6 9
The Minnesota legislature was apparently concerned that the primary
caretaker standard was overly mechanical and inflexible in application.17
The cases discussed in Sections III and IV, however, do not indicate that the
primary caretaker standard has been applied rigidly by either West Virginia
or Minnesota courts. To the contrary, the major problem is that the standard
has been applied too casually. Women who are undisputedly their children's
primary caretakers have lost custody for reasons having nothing to do with
their fitness as pareits (as defined by the courts in the context of the primary
caretaker standard)." 1 Thus, it is not entirely clear why the Minnesota
legislature sought so aggressively to abrogate the primary caretaker
standard.1
72
Regardless of the legislature's rationale for discarding the primary caretaker
standard, judicial application of Minn. Stat. § 518.17 may put women in an
even more precarious position with respect to custody of their children. 7 1
In other states where a similar best interests test is employed with the primary
caretaker as one of numerous factors to be considered, women lose custody
of children for whom they have cared almost exclusively.
168. Id.
169. "The primary caretaker factor may not be used as a presumption in determining the best interests
of the child." Id.
170. See, e.g., Maxfield v. Maxfield, 452 N.W.2d 219, 222 (Minn. 1990) ("Apparently the 1989
amendments were a reaction to the mechanical way in which Pikuda was being applied.") In his dissent,
Justice Yetka agreed with the majority on this point: "[T]he clear intent of the legislature [is) ...to
eliminate inflexible and stereotypical presumptions in child custody cases." Id. at 224.
171. See supra Sections III & IV.
172. However, the practical significance of the adoption of a hybrid test in place of the pure primary
caretaker test is questionable. In a random sample of nine recent Minnesota custody cases, I found only
two instances in which courts did not award custody to the primary caretaker, even though the primary
caretaker is now merely one of the twelve factors to be considered. For cases in which courts awarded
custody to the primary caretaker, see Bennett v. Bennett, No. C4-91-1051, 1991 WL 263486 (Minn. Ct.
App. Dec. 17, 1991); Rutanen v. Olson, 475 N.W.2d 100 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Gibson v. Gibson, 471
N.W.2d 384 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991); Braun v. Braun, No. CO-90-2607, 1991 WL 80691 (Minn. Ct. App.
May 21, 1991); Kern v. Kern, No. C9-90-2475, 1991 WL 80699 (Minn. Ct. App. May 21, 1991); Matlon
v. Thomas, No. C5-90-1808, 1991 WL 34686 (Minn. Ct. App.); Dauer v. Dauer, No. C9-90-905, 1990
WL 146606 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 1990). For cases in which courts did not award custody to the primary
caretaker, see Pierce v. Pierce, No. C2-91-805, 1991 WL 185095 (Minn. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 1991);
Shaney-Kearney v. Kearney, 1991 WL 30345 (Minn. Ct. App.).
173. Note, however, that as of January 4, 1991, four women and three men compose Minnesota's
supreme court. While this recent (and historic) change in court composition may have no implications for
the future of child custody decisions in Minnesota, feminists can hope that a female majority will be
especially vigilant about gender discrimination in the law. See David Margolick, Women's Milestone:
Majority on Minnesota Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 1991, at B16 ("No one is predicting that the new
female majority on the seven-member Minnesota court will instantly produce changes in its jurisprudence,
though some lawyers anticipate heightened sensitivity to cases involving domestic abuse, child custody,
spousal support, sexual harassment, employment discrimination and other issues of traditional concern to
women.").
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B. Other Hybrid States
In Merriam v. Merriam,174 a recent Utah case, the trial court awarded
custody to the father, Todd, finding that neither parent was the primary
caretaker.17 At trial, Todd accused his ex-wife, Raychelle, of having affairs
and of hitting their son about the face several times. Raychelle denied these
allegations. She asserted that it was Todd who had committed adultery, who
had abused drugs and alcohol, and who had threatened and assaulted her.
176
Despite Raychelle's testimony, neither the trial court nor the appellate court
accepted any of the allegations except that of Raychelle's alleged infidelity.
Todd's proof of this "fact" rested solely on his own testimony that Raychelle
had admitted to marital infidelity, and the testimony of one witness who "took
the Fifth" when asked if he had engaged in sexual intercourse with
Raychelle. " In affirming the trial court's decision, the appellate court stated,
"Although Raychelle denied infidelity, we defer to the trial court's assessment
that Todd's testimony was more credible. . . . Nor do we find that the trial
court abused its discretion in considering Raychelle's sexual conduct in making
its custody decision."' The court indicated that to rely "solely" on
Raychelle's sexual conduct would have been an abuse of discretion, but noted
that the trial court had indeed considered other "relevant" factors, including
the relative wealth of Todd and Raychelle. '79
In re Custody of Temos is another example of judicial misapplication of
the hybrid best interests/primary caretaker standard. i" The lower court in
this Pennsylvania case awarded custody to the father, in large part because the
mother was involved in a relationship with a married man, and because she
had become "increasingly career-oriented."18 The author of the lower court
opinion acknowledged that the suppositions upon which his opinion was based
made him "sound like an old stodgy judge;" he admitted "that mores and
standards of the community have changed .. "182 Even so, he ignored
testimony from the children's teachers, neighbor, and babysitter indicating that
the children were doing well in their mother's custody.'83 Disregarding
previous Pennsylvania decisions,'84 the lower court presumed that the
174. 799 P.2d 1172 (Utah App. 1990).
175. Id. at 1175. In Utah, the primary caretaker is to be given "considerable weight" in custody
determinations. See Davis v. Davis, 749 P.2d 647, 648 (Utah 1988).
176. 799 P.2d at 1174.
177. Id. at 1176-77.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 1177. 1 would argue that a woman's financial status is not relevant to her parenting ability.
See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
180. 450 A.2d 111 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982). When Temos was decided, the child custody standard in
use in Pennsylvania was the best interests of the child, with "positive consideration" given to the primary
caretaker parent. See, e.g., Jordan v. Jordan, 448 A.2d 1113, 1115-16 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
181. 450 A.2d at 112.
182. Id. at 121.
183. Id. at 115.
184. Id. at 122.
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woman's relationship with a married man and her career responsibilities
rendered her a poor custodial parent." 5
The superior court reversed, noting that, "Instead of recognizing and giving
weight to the beneficial effects on the children of the care and home that the
mother has provided, the lower court concentrated its attention on certain
aspects of the mother's life that it disapproved of."186 The superior court also
observed, "In terms of legal reasoning, the lower court's error was to think
in terms of presumptions. " 87
Seibert v. Seibert"8  also illustrates some courts' reliance on
unsubstantiated presumptions in applying a hybrid custody standard. In Seibert,
an Ohio appellate court reversed a lower court's erroneous award of custody
to Jeffrey Seibert. Although it is a relevant factor in custody determinations
in Ohio, the trial court's opinion failed to acknowledge Vicki Seibert's status
as primary caretaker. Instead, the trial court's decision rested largely on the
testimony of a clinical psychologist who stated that Vicki, while not an unfit
parent, was "unstable" because she would have to relocate and find a job with
her limited qualifications, because she had lost the emotional and financial
support of her husband, and because she took prescription medications for a
"nervous condition."" 9 The trial court failed to recognize the possibility that
the instability in Vicki's life was a foreseeable-and temporary-result of both
the divorce itself and the failed marriage which preceded it, rather than an
inherent flaw in her parenting ability. 19
The trial court's rationale leads almost inescapably to the conclusion that
women are unfit parents because they have gotten divorced. Women are
usually left poorer after divorce, both because many women work as
homemakers during their marriage and thus find it difficult to re-enter the job
market after divorce,19' and because most women rely on their husbands for
some amount of financial support during marriage which often becomes
unavailable to them upon divorce. 92 If courts permit the relative financial
effects of divorce on each parent to affect custody awards, women will almost
185. Id. at 115-16.
186. Id. at 115.
187. Id. at 121.
188. 584 N.E.2d 41 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).
189. Id. at 44.
190. This fact was not lost on the appellate court, however, which stated, "The conclusions which
the trial court drew from [the psychologist's] testimony ignores [sic] the fact that [Vicki's] financial and
emotional instability stem in part from her relationship with [Jeffrey] and her reliance upon him to provide
for her financial well-being." Id.
191. "ITIhe woman who has not worked outside the home during the marriage . . may be . . .
disadvantaged by a lack of workplace skills-and various forms of sex discrimination-if she seeks work
after the divorce .... [Wlomen may be systematically disadvantaged in the marketplace, after divorce."
Minow, supra note 9, at 909.
192. According to the results of a study of 20,000 families, fewer than half of the absent fathers were
paying child support in the first year following marital breakup. This study also found that although many
women returned to full or part-time work following marital dissolution, their family income declined by
26%. Jason DeParle, Child Poverty Twice as Likely After Family Split. Study Says, N.Y. TIMES, March
2, 1991, at 8.
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invariably be disadvantaged.
These cases demonstrate that overly vague, flexible custody standards like
the hybrid primary caretaker/best interests test can give rise to an abuse of
judicial discretion. This causes some women to lose custody of their children
not because they are inadequate parents, but simply because they are, as
women, subject to judges' personal prejudices. The solution to this problem
is not, however, to abandon the primary caretaker presumption, but rather to
apply it in its "pure" form with a well-defined unfitness exception. This
approach, which is set forth in the following section, will effectively sever the
tie between gender bias and child custody awards that has been preserved by
the hybrid test.
VI. PROPOSED REVISIONS TO THE PRIMARY CARETAKER STANDARD
The primary caretaker standard is laudable in theory; in practice, however,
it may operate to the detriment of women and children alike. As discussed in
Section II of this article, numerous commentators have warned that lengthy,
uncertain custody trials can gravely harm children psychologically. 93 These
commentators favor stringent custody standards that do not rely on the
predilections of individual judges. Such standards would hopefully produce
more predictable outcomes without the emotional trauma associated with long,
embattled trials t94
Similar concerns about the judiciary's handling of custody disputes have
been raised by feminists. Women were historically disadvantaged by a
presumption that children remain with their fathers after divorce.'95 Then,
an equally sexist presumption favored mothers as custodial parents. 196 While
this preference may have helped individual mothers seeking custody, it
nonetheless disadvantaged women as a class by perpetuating stereotypical
gender roles. 9 7 Since the more subjective "best interests of the child"
standard has come into vogue in courts across the country, 19 women have
fared no better. Women lack the resources to hire experts and engage in
193. E.g., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 10, at 42-43 ("The courts, social agencies, and
all the adults concerned with child placement must greatly reduce the time they take for decision ....
[T]o avoid irreparable psychological injury, placement, whenever in dispute, must be treated as the
emergency that it is for the child."). Justice Neely states:
The degree to which children suffer during divorce is a widely discussed subject. The slowly
grinding machinery of the courts inevitably exacerbates the emotional stresses that result from
the simple fact of divorce .... The magnitude of these effects is a direct function of the time
it takes to conclude the proceedings.
Neeley, supra note 17, at 176.
194. See, e.g., Neely, supra note 17, at 182 (arguing that "[ajlthough th[e primary caretaker standard]
may appear overly cut-and-dried," it is the standard which best serves children by reducing the amount
of litigation, "[blecause litigationperse can be the cause of serious emotional damage to children .... ").
195. See supra notes 16-17 and accompanying text.
196. See supra text accompanying notes 18-25.
197. See supra text accompanying notes 26-28.
198. See supra text accompanying notes 29-32.
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prolonged legal battles; their ex-husbands coerce them into accepting lower
child support payments by threatening custody battles.' They are also
disfavored as custodial parents because they lack resources;2°1 they have not
remarried;2 2 they have relationships with men2 3 or with women;2°4 they
work full-time;2 s or they do not work.2" In short, even the most personal
aspects of women's lives are scrutinized by judges whose morals and values
often reflect presumptions about gender roles.
The primary caretaker standard can be tailored to address the concerns of
both child advocates and feminists. As the cases discussed earlier indicate, the
problem lies in the extremely vague, ill-defined "unfitness" exception to the
standard. The standard will operate in a truly gender neutral manner only if
the gaping loophole ironically termed an "exception" becomes what it should
be: a narrowly-drawn, precisely-defined set of criteria whose application
requires no judicial subjectivity.2 7 Furthermore, the purpose of these criteria
should be to prevent specific harms to children, not to punish women for the
lifestyles they have chosen or have been forced to adopt.
My proposal does not absolutely eliminate exceptions to the primary
caretaker presumption, for there clearly are some primary caretakers who are
unfit. Instead, I propose a reform that would define and narrow the unfitness
exception to the primary caretaker standard. A more narrowly drawn exception
would increase the certainty of custody decisions and prevent judges from
employing biased assumptions and scrutinizing aspects of parents' personal
lives that have no bearing on their fitness. The model I propose parallels
reforms suggested in the child abuse and neglect context. Adoption of such a
proposal would create a system in which parents seeking custody after divorce
are held to the same standard of fitness as nondivorcing parents."'
199. See supra text accompaying note 37.
200. See supra text accompanying note 41.
201. See supra text accompanying note 179.
202. See supra text accompanying notes 163-165.
203. See supra text accompanying notes 181-85.
204. See supra note 107.
205. See supra text accompanying note 185.
206. See Polikoff, supra note 17, at 239:
The flip side of penalizing mothers with limited financial resources due to sporadic or part-time
employment is penalizing mothers who work full-time for not being sufficiently available to their
children. Since men are traditionally expected to be full-time workers, fathers do not face this
disadvantage. In fact, a man with a full-time job who provides any assistance in childrearing,
however limited, looks like a dedicated father, while a woman with a full-time job who still does
primary, but not all, caretaking, looks like 'half' a mother, dissatisfied with the childrearing role.
See also Crippen, supra note 33, at 463 ("[Alpplication of the [primary caretaker] preference often results
in the celebration of caretaking contributions of fathers and the criticism of shortcomings of mothers.")
(citations omitted).
207. "There is a marked trend toward making custody modifications fairly easy to obtain. Instead,
rigorous statutory criteria should firmly limit both the parents' ability to bring such litigation and the courts'
discretion to make such custodial modifications." Joan G. Wexler, Rethinking the Modification of Child
Custody Decrees, 94 YALE L.J. 757, 760 (1985).
208. See also Mnookin & Kornhauser, supra note 40, at 957 ("We believe divorcing parents should
be given considerable freedom to decide custody matters-subject only to the same minimum standards
for protecting the child from neglect and abuse that the state imposes on all families.").
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A. Application of Child Neglect/Abuse Standards in Custody Cases
In the context of parental neglect, states typically remove children from
their parents' custody only when there is evidence of child neglect or abuse
by the parents.2 ' 9 Commentators have criticized state abuse and neglect laws
for employing vague standards that invite courts to rely on their personal
values and biases in determining whether to terminate parental rights.20 The
parental fitness test I propose is borrowed in large part from the critique
offered by Michael Wald in 1975.21 Wald notes that most abuse and neglect
statutes are vaguely defined, t2 and are based on "desired" parental behavior
instead of on specific harms to the children in question. 213 Wald argues
primarily from the perspective of the child, and attempts to minimize the
state's role as custodian. 24 The concerns he raises in the child neglect
context, such as abuse of judicial discretion and courts' frequent reliance on
unsubstantiated presumptions, parallel feminist concerns in the context of
divorce and custody.
Child custody law should strive to minimize decisions based on judges'
personal biases and opportunities for non-primary caretaker parents to
challenge courts' original custody orders.215 Wald's ideas suggest that we
209. In New York, for example, a neglected child is defined as a child under eighteen:
(i) whose physical, mental or emotional condition has been impaired or is in imminent danger
of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of his parent or other person legally responsible
for his care to exercise a minimum degree of care
(A) in supplying the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter or education in accordance with
the provisions of part one of article sixty-five of the education law, or medical, dental,
optometrical or surgical care, though financially able to do so or offered financial or other
reasonable means to do so; or
(B) in providing the child with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting
or allowing to be inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof, including the infliction of excessive
corporal punishment; or by using a drug or drugs; or by using alcoholic beverages to the extent
that he loses self-control of his actions; or by any other acts of a similarly serious nature
requiring the aid of the court ....
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (Supp. 1986).
210. Michael Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 'Neglected" Children: A Search for Realistic
Standards, 27 STAN. L. REv. 985 (1975).
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1000.
213. Id. at 1004. Wald notes more specifically that:
Because the statutes do not reflect a considered analysis of what types of harm justify the risks
of intervention, decisionmaking is left to the ad hoc analysis of social workers and judges. There
is substantial evidence that their decisions often reflect personal values about childrearing, which
are not supported by scientific evidence, and which result in removing children from
environments in which they are doing adequately. Only through carefully drawn statutes, drafted
in terms of specific harms to the child, can we limit the possibility of intervention in situations
where it will do more harm than good.
Id. at 1001-02.
214. See also BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 10, at 12 ("A policy of minimum coercive
intervention by the state . . . accords not only with our firm belief as citizens in individual freedom and
human dignity, but also with our professional understanding of the intricate developmental processes of
childhood.").
215. See Wexler, supra note 207, at 782:
Children of divorce, and their families, need a new, more restrictive standard for custody
modification. No custodial modification should be allowed . . . unless the child is seriously
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must first identify the specific harms to children that we seek to avoid through
the unfitness exception to the primary caretaker presumption. Second, we must
fashion a definition of parental fitness that addresses only those specific harms,
and that does not allow judges' personal values to enter into the calculus. 6
According to Wald, state intervention is warranted only when the child has
been seriously harmed and the intervention will do more good than harm.2 7
More specifically, he argues that:
[C]oercive intervention should be permissible only when a child has
suffered or is likely to suffer serious physical injury as a result of abuse
or inadequate care; when a child is suffering from severe emotional
damage and his parents are unwilling to deal with his problems without
coercive intervention; when a child is sexually abused; when a child
is suffering from a serious medical condition and his parents are
unwilling to provide him suitable medical treatment; or when a child
is committing delinquent acts at the urging or with the help of his
parents.218
This definition of child neglect should also apply in the context of unfitness
exceptions in divorce. 9 If it were substituted for the Garska and Pikula
unfitness tests,220 it would eliminate much of the judicial discretion and
gender bias at work in the cases discussed in Sections III through V of this
article. Such a test has the advantage in the custody context of removing
women's sexual conduct and similarly subjective factors from judicial
consideration unless such factors cause harm to the children whose custody is
at issue. Under the proposed test, only a concrete set of specific harms to the
child(ren) is relevant to the court in determining whether a primary caretaker
endangered. The definition of endangerment should be as specific as possible, focusing on
whether the custodial parent is taking prudent care of the child .... This new test would not
differ substantially from model statutes that define when the state may, due to parental neglect,
intervene in family decisionmaking and assume responsibility for a child.
216. See Wald, supra note 210, at 1034 ("[Tlhe morality of the parents and the type of upbringing
they provide should not constitute a basis for state intervention.").
217. Id. at 1005. Cf. Wexler, supra note 207, at 817-18 ("A custodial parent should lose custody only
when there is actual or imminent risk of serious harm to the child and the potential detriment to the child
caused by remaining in the family outweighs the harms'and disruptions that a change in custody would
cause.")
218. Wald, supra note 210, at 1008. See generally INSTITUTE OF JUDICIAL ADMIN. & AM. BAR ASS.,
JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS PROJECT, STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT § 2.1 (1981),
cited in Wexler, supra note 207, at 782-83 n.95. Cf BEFORE THE BEST INTERESTS, supra note 10, at
193-96 (outlining suggested grounds for state intervention in child placement matters).
219. See Wexler, supra note 207, at 817-18 ("A custodial parent should lose custody only when there
is actual or imminent risk of serious harm to the child and the potential detriment to the child caused by
remaining in the family outweighs the harms and disruptions that a change in custody would cause."). State
intervention in child abuse/neglect cases is not entirely analogous to judicial custody decisions; the former
will result in divestment of custody from both parents, whereas the latter generally results in one parent's
retention of custody. In my view, however, this distinction is not significant enough to render a
neglect/abuse standard for parental unfitness inappropriate for analogy to custody cases.
220. See supra notes 53 & 142 and accompanying text.
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is fit.
Moreover, the test I propose would require more than vague allegations
of unfitness before a court could reconsider a custody order. To reopen the
issue of custody once the primary caretaker has been awarded custody, the
noncustodial parent would have the initial burden of proof. If the noncustodial
parent is unable to establish that the child had suffered one or more of the
enumerated harms while in the care of the primary caretaker, the original
custody order would not be subject to further judicial inquiry. This requirement
will minimize the trauma to both the custodial parent (usually the mother) and
the child. The financial as well as emotional toll on divorced women and their
children will be greatly reduced if custody litigation does not linger on through
one or more rounds of appeals.
B. Physically Abusive Husbands and Fathers
Several of the cases discussed earlier illustrate a disturbing problem which
is not addressed by Wald's proposed child neglect test. In Pikula, Tanghe, and
Merriam,221 each court awarded custody of the children to the ex-husband
even though he had battered his wife. As previously discussed, the courts
declared the women unfit on the basis of a variety of questionable
justifications. The fitness of their husbands, however, who had a history of
physical violence in the home, was not even addressed. 2 Men who batter
their wives are more likely to physically abuse their children as well;' in
addition, battering men who remarry tend to remain physically abusive in their
future domestic relationships." Evidence suggests that children exposed to
physical violence in their homes are more likely to grow up to be batterers or
victims of battering themselves."z It is preferable to remove children from
homes in which battering takes place rather than to award custody to a parent
who is likely to continue this practice.
In short, I argue that men who batter their wives are presumptively unfit
for custodial parenthood. Their ability to refrain from abusing their children
is questionable, and the long-term effects on children who see their fathers
abuse their mothers may be extremely detrimental. My proposed fitness test
221. See supra notes 132, 144, & 174 and accompanying text.
222. See Woods, et al., supra note 88, at 1133 ("Courts are refusing to consider a father's battering
of his wife as evidence that he is an unfit parent . . . even when the acts are committed in front of the
children. On the other hand, other forms of moral and criminal culpability are sufficient for a denial of
custody.").
223. See supra note 154.
224. LENORE WALKER, TERRIFYING LovE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND How SOCIETY
RESPONDS 72 (1989) (batterers frequently repeat battering behavior in subsequent relationships with other
women). See also Lenore Walker & Angela Browne, Gender and Victimization by Intimates, 53 J.
PERSONALITY 179, 192 (1985) (at least half of battering men who receive treatment continue their violent
behavior with new partners).
225. See, e.g., Walker, supra note 224, at 146 ("Children who grow up in abusive families are more
likely to be on the giving or receiving end of abuse in the families they create as adults."). See also
ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 23-35 (1987).
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thus includes physical or emotional abuse of a spouse as grounds for a judicial
finding of parental unfitness. Not only will this provision protect the children
of battering men to the greatest extent possible, but it will also spare battered
women the additional trauma of losing custody of their children to men who
have repeatedly abused them.
C. A Proposed Child Custody Statute
In summary, I would adopt the primary caretaker standard delineated by
the court in Garska. The court describes ten parental duties and states that the
parent who takes primary responsibility for them, inter alia, is the primary
caretaker.'2 6 The ten factors are to be applied irrespective of the age of the
minor child. There shall be no exceptions to the application of this standard
unless the court determines the primary caretaker to be unfit. Only the
following conditions may be considered as evidence that a primary caretaker
is unfit:
(1) Physical abuse of the child(ren) by, or with the approval of, the primary
caretaker. "Physical abuse" shall be defined as "a physical harm, inflicted
nonaccidentally upon [the child] by his/her parent[ ], which causes, or creates
a substantial risk of causing disfigurement, impairment of bodily functioning,
or other serious physical injury."227 There shall be a rebuttable presumption
that a primary caretaker parent "who knew or should have known that his [or
her] child was being abused [but] did not take reasonable action to protect the
child"22 is responsible for the abuse of that child by another individual. This
presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the primary caretaker was
incapable of taking steps to prevent the abuse due to his or her exceptionally
limited intellectual or financial resources, or due to severe emotional or
physical intimidation of the primary caretaker by the child abuser.
(2) Psychological abuse of the child(ren), by or with the approval of, the
primary caretaker. "Psychological abuse" shall be defined as a psychological
harm, inflicted nonaccidentally upon the child by his/her parent, which causes
or creates a substantial risk of causing serious emotional, physical, ot
developmental disability. Psychological abuse connotes both overt parental
action, such as verbal abuse/threats, and parental inaction, in the form of
neglect or deprivation of parental attention/affection. Psychological abuse may
226. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
227. JUVENILE JUSTICE STANDARDS RELATING TO ABUSE AND NEGLECT pt. II § 2.1(A) (Institute of
Judicial Admin. Tentative Draft 1977), reprinted in MARK HARDIN & PATRICIA TAZZARA, TERMINATION
OF PARENTAL RIGHTS: A SUMMARY AND COMPARISON OF GROUNDS FROM NINE MODEL ACTS 35 (1981).
My definition of physical abuse is based on the Justice Department's proposed criteria for deciding when
a child is endangered.
228. Victor Pike, et al., Model Dissolution of Parent-Child Relationship Act § VII(c)(2) (Suggested
Draft 1976), reprinted in HARDIN & TAZZARA, supra note 227, at 40.
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be manifested by such symptoms as a child's emotional illness, inability to
progress educationally, loss of sleep or appetite, or poor socialization skills.
Again, knowledge of such abuse, coupled with inaction, renders the primary
caretaker responsible for the abuse, unless s/he is incapable of responding as
detailed in (1).
(3) Sexual abuse of the child(ren) by, or with the approval of, the primary
caretaker. "Sexual abuse" shall be defined as the commission against the child
of any sexual offense punishable under state law. The same rebuttable
presumption described in (1) and (2) shall apply.
(4) Serious physical or developmental harm to the child(ren) resulting from
inadequate care by the primary caretaker. "Inadequate care" shall be defined
as
fail[ure] to supply the child with adequate food, clothing, shelter,
education (as defined by law), or health care, although financially able
to do so or offered financial or other reasonable means to do so....
"Adequate health care" includes any medical or non-medical remedial
health care permitted or authorized under state law.229
However, a primary caretaker parent "who, legitimately practicing his [or her]
religious beliefs, does not provide specified medical treatment for a child, is
not for that reason alone a[n unfit] parent and the court is not precluded from
ordering necessary medical services for the child according to existing state
law."" The rebuttable presumption outlined in (1) and (2) applies here as
well.
(5) Commission of delinquent acts by the child(ren) "as a result of pressure
from or with the approval of their . . . primary caretaker.""' The primary
caretaker parent shall be assumed to "approve" of the child's delinquency if
that parent knew or should have known of this behavior and failed to take
reasonable steps to thwart it. The parent's intellectual and financial resources
may be considered only insofar as these factors have an impact on the parent's
ability to take requisite delinquency prevention/cessation measures.
(6) Physical or emotional abuse of the nonprimary caretaker parent by the
229. Sanford N. Katz, Freeing Children for Permanent Placement Through a Model Act, 12 FAM.
L.Q. 203, 209 (1978). This language is borrowed from Sanford Katz's Model Act, aimed at establishing
standards for freeing children in foster care from their "legal limbo" in order to "establish a permanent
plan for their future." Id. at 203.
230. Id. at 217.
231. STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUVENILE JUSTICE § 3.113(h) (Report of Nat'l
Advisory Comm. for Juvenile Justice & Delinquency Prevention 1980), reprinted in HARDIN & TAZZARA,
supra note 227, at 46.
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primary caretaker parent. Such abuse shall be defined as any behavior which
is punishable under state domestic violence laws or other applicable criminal
laws.
As noted earlier, the noncustodial parent seeking to reopen a custody
decision on the grounds that the primary caretaker is an unfit parent would
initially have to proffer specific evidence that the primary caretaker meets one
of the above criteria for unfitness. Without such specific evidence, no
reconsideration or modification of custody would be warranted.
VII. CONCLUSION
Feminists have long been troubled by the gender bias, express or implied,
in various child custody standards. The primary caretaker standard, at least
on its face, alleviates this problem."2 It is gender-neutral and fact-specific,
apparently relying little on judges' personal notions about the appropriateness
of women's lifestyles and behavior. Unfortunately, the vague unfitness
exception invites courts to scrutinize and pass judgment upon women's sexual
behavior, their financial affairs, their living arrangements, their friends' sexual
orientation, and any other factors courts consider "relevant" to women's fitness
as parents. In finding mothers unfit under the primary caretaker standard,
lower courts in particular have employed the same gender-biased philosophies
regarding parenting and family life that made other custody standards
unworkable for women.
Feminists should not abandon the primary caretaker standard altogether,
but should refine the standard to promote practical equality for women. Section
VI of this article provides a clear, narrowly defined unfitness exception to the
primary caretaker standard. Borrowing from commentary in the area of child
neglect, I base my definition of unfitness on specific, provable harm to
children. This exception, in conjunction with the primary caretaker
presumption, will work for women and children. The result will be a child
custody standard that not only reduces litigation and promotes certainty of
outcome, but also furthers the feminist goals of formal and practical gender
equality.
Approximately half of all marriages end in divorce;" 3 approximately half
of all currently divorcing couples have children." 4 The number of children
232. See Minow, supra note 9, at 908 (primary caretaker preference "recognizelsi the actual social
practices without confining women and men to traditional roles .... ).
233. Donald H. Stone, The Moral Dilemma: Child Custody When One Parent is Homosexual or
Lesbian-An Empirical Study, 23 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 711, 712 (1989) (citing Lenore J. Weitzman,
Changing Families, Changing Laws: Ten Major Trends That Have Altered the Lifestyles of Parents and
Children, 5 FAM. ADVOC. 2, 4 (1982)).
234. Stone, supra note 233, at 712 (citing Howard A. Davidson & Katherine Gerlach, Child Custody
Disputes: The Children's Perspective, in LEGAL RIGHTS OF CHILDREN 252 (Robert M. Horwitz & Howard
A. Davidson eds., 1984); Weitzman, supra note 233, at 5).
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involved in divorce has more than tripled since 1970.Y' These dramatic
statistics highlight the need for child custody laws steeped in fairness, equality,
and empathy. Practical changes in child custody statutes will not "make
everthing all better" for the thousands of women and children involved in
divorce. Such changes are, however, necessary steps toward even-handed
administration of justice in this emotionally charged legal context.
235. Id.
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